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• Eight •
Individual Rights in the Work Place:
The Burger Court and Labor Law
Theodore J. St. Antoine

The Supreme Court, like other institutions, must play the part that the
times demand, often with small regard for the personal predilections of its
membership. The Warren Court and the Burger Court, in their respective
contributions to the law of union-employer-employee relations, almost reversed the roles they might have been expected to assume. The major
accomplishment of the Court in the labor area during the Warren era was
a fundamental restructuring of intergovernmental relationships,' while the
Court's overriding concern throughout the Burger decade of the 1970s and
beyond has been the defining of individual rights in the work place.
During its first thirteen years the Burger Court averaged about a dozen
noteworthy labor decisions a term. Over half of these, or eighty-six by my
count, dealt with the rights of employees vis-a-vis their employers or unions,
as distinguished from the more conventional competing claims of employers
and labor organizations. By far the largest single category consisted of
sixty-five cases of alleged discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion,
national origin or age. Twenty-one other decisions covered employees' rights
to fair representation by their bargaining agents or their rights as union
members. By contrast, the Warren legacy contains about five times as many
leading cases dealing with traditional labor-management disputes as with
individual rights in employment. 2
The changing pattern of the Supreme Court's labor agenda over the past
three decades was entirely natural. When Warren Burger became chief
justice in 1969, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) was almost
thirty-five years old, and the main interpretive lines of union-management
law had already been laid down. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
covering equal employment opportunity, had been in effect for only four
years, however, and the first cases arising under it were just beginning
to reach the Supreme Court. Race and sex discrimination are covered extensively elsewhere in this volume. 3 But one category of Title VII decision
so dramatically juxtaposes traditional labor relations values and the new
values of equal employment opportunity that it calls for discussion here.
157
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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AND SENIORITY

Aside from affirmative action or "reverse discrimination," the most painful
and persistent clash of worthy interests resulting from antidiscrimination
legislation has been presented by the problem of seniority. The essence of
seniority, of course, is to give preference to more experienced workers in
such employment decisions as layoffs, recalls, and promotions and also in
such benefits as step increases in pay, length of vacations, and amount of
pension. In part the notion is that the veteran employee is entitled as a
matter of equity to greater job security than newer recruits. In part the
aim is to remove a source of worker discontent by substituting an objective
standard for job priorities in place of what might otherwise be arbitrariness
or favoritism by employer or union.
The leaders of the AFL-CIO and several major international unions were
among the prime movers for the inclusion of an equal employment opportunity title in the 1964 Civil Rights Act.< Opponents sought to rally grassroots union opposition by flooding thousands of locals with warnings that
the enactment of Title VII would "destroy" the hard-earned seniority rights
of many workers. The AFL-CIO and legislators backing the bill responded
by assuring union members and the Congress that Title VII would have no
adverse impact on acquired seniority. The principle of "last hired, first fired"
would apply "even in the case where owing to discrimination prior to the
effective date of the title, white workers had more seniority than Negroes. " 5
Further to allay concerns, section 703(h) was added to the bill, providing
that it would not be an unfair employment practice for an employer to
differentiate in terms of employment "pursuant to a bona fide seniority
. . . system, provided that such differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate. "•
Since disinterested observers of the 1964 civil rights debate in Congress
believed AFL-CIO support was crucial to success, these reassurances were
probably the price that had to be paid for the enactment of Title VII. Yet
the continuation of seniority systems without any change would leave black
workers severely handicapped. A black employee moving into a formerly
lily-white department or line of progression would start with zero seniority.
He would be the first laid off, the last recalled, and the last promoted.
The racial discrimination of the past prevented the black worker from earning seniority credits in jobs traditionally held by whites, and now lack of
them would hobble his efforts to step into better positions even after the
racial bars were removed.
This "perpetuation of the effects of past discrimination" proved too much
to swallow for most of the federal trial and appellate courts that first encountered it. 7 The initial cases arose in plants or shops where "departmental"
or "job" seniority prevailed, rather than seniority based on total time in
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the plant. Almost invariably the courts found that making post-act determinations regarding such matters as layoffs, recalls, or promotions on the basis
of pre-act seniority credits acquired under discriminatory job conditions
constituted violations of Title VII. Even though the act was not retroactive,
Congress could not have meant to "freeze an entire generation of Negro
employees into discriminatory patterns that existed before the Act. "8 Section
703(h) was disposed of by saying that a "racially discriminatory seniority
system" existing prior to the act was not "bona fide." Concededly, the
victims of pre-act discrimination who were never hired at all could not
later claim credit for the time they might otherwise have worked. But
blacks who were actually employed in a plant in a segregated department
or line of progression could demand that the seniority they had acquired
in their black jobs be accorded "equal status with time worked in white
jobs."9 In short, Congress was viewed as preserving only "plant" seniority,
not "job" or "departmental" seniority when the latter would carry forward
credits obtained under pre-act discriminatory conditions.
This distinction makes much sense as a matter of policy. Unfortunately,
there is not a hint in the legislative history that Congress ever entertained
such a distinction. The function of seniority to protect the equity of veteran
workers in their jobs and to provide an objective standard for employment
preferences is essentially the same whether the seniority is linked to a
particular job, or a given department, or a whole plant. Be that as it may,
by the early 1970s the battle over seniority under Title VII seemed finished.
The vast majority of federal rulings had struck down seniority systems that
"perpetuated the effects" of pre-act discrimination. The Supreme Court had
denied certiorari. In 1972 Congress undertook a comprehensive revision of
Title VII 10 and did nothing to overturn the seniority decisions. Eventually,
the view that Title VII reached seniority systems perpetuating pre-act discrimination was accepted by six courts of appeals in the holdings of thirty
cases and by two other courts of appeals in dicta, all without dissent. 11
Understandably, most sensible lawyers counselled their clients to settle
claims, even with million-dollar price tags. Only the diehards fought on.
Then, in 1977, the Supreme Court dropped its bombshell. In Teamsters
v. United States [T.I.M.E.-D.C.], 12 the Court broke with the long line of
lower court precedent and held, 7 to 2, that section 703(h) does indeed
sustain "bona fide" seniority plans, regardless of their perpetuation of the
effects of prior discrimination. Speaking for the majority, Justice Stewart
began by agreeing that Title VII reached practices "fair in form, but discriminatory in operation," and acknowledged the perpetuation of the effects
of pre-act discrimination fitted that prescription. He added: "Were it not
for § 703(h), the seniority system in this case would seem to fall." 13 "But,"
he proceeded, "both the literal terms of§ 703(h) and the legislative history
of Title VII demonstrate that Congress considered this very effect of many
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seniority systems and extended a measure of immunity to them." Justice
Stewart found no support in the legislative history and "no rational basis"
for distinguishing between discriminatees employed in less desirable jobs
and those denied employment entirely. He recognized that only "bona fide"
seniority plans are immunized by section 703(h), but pointed out that the
plan challenged in Teamsters applied equally to all races and ethnic groups.
Whites as well as blacks and Hispanics were "locked" into jobs as city
drivers and servicemen and were discouraged from transferring to superior
highway jobs. The employer's separate seniority units for highway drivers
and for others was in accord with rational industry practice, did not have
its "genesis in racial discrimination," and had been "maintained free from
any illegal purpose." 14
Justice Stewart's opinion was a sound, lawyerly product, the opinion that
should have been written in 1970. The question is whether it was wise
judicial statesmanship in 1977. There is little doubt that he reflected the
thinking (and perhaps the nonthinking) of the Congress of 1964. But time
had passed. Unions, employers, and white employees had endured their
defeats and vented their rage. The more accommodating had bowed to the
seemingly inevitable and worked out the apparently necessary adjustments.
Neither the Supreme Court nor Congress had intervened. Now, a half dozen
years after the tumult had begun to die down, the Supreme Court reopened
the whole roiling controversy in a way that tended both to mock conciliatory unions and employers and to revive antagonisms among black and
white employees. It is understandable that a legal craftsman like Justice
Stewart may have felt driven to the result he reached by the legislative
history of Title VII. There is ample precedent, however, for construing an
earlier statute in light of subsequent legislation dealing with the same subject. 15 Had it wished, the Court could easily have justified a different decision
by relying on the discreet yet suggestive silence of Congress in enacting
the 1972 amendments.
Having set the clock back to 1964, the Court was then forced to confront
an even closer legal question regarding seniority systems. Suppose an employer adopted a facially neutral seniority plan after· the effective date of
Title VII, but with a resulting discriminatory impact on black workers.
Arguably, section 703(h) should not immunize such an arrangement, because that provision was primarily designed to preserve the established
expectations of white workers concerning the seniority rights they had acquired before Title VII went into effect. Nonetheless, in American Tobacco
Co. v. Patterson, 16 a 5 to 4 majority of the Court concluded that 703(h)
was not so limited, and that it applied to sustain post-act as well as preact seniority systems. The dissent properly objected that the specific reason
given in the legislative debates for the adoption of section 703(h) was the
desire to protect pre-act seniority credits. Yet the majority could correctly
respond that 703(h) itself "makes no distinction between pre- and post-act
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seniority systems," and none of its proponents explicitly indicated such a
distinction was intended. Patterson quite reasonably could have gone either
way, and it might well have been decided differently had Justice O'Connor
not replaced Justice Stewart at the beginning of the 1981 term.
The upshot of Teamsters [T./.M.E.-D.C.] and Patterson is to place a
strong judicial imprimatur on the concept of seniority, one of the most
hallowed values of organized labor, even against the competing claims
of adversely affected minority groups. Discriminatory impact alone is not
enough to invalidate a seniority system; an actual intent to discriminate
must be proved. Moreover, the finding of intent or motive is a pure question
of fact to be determined by the trial court, reversible only for clear error. 17
This of course does not mean that a court may not consider disparate
effects on minorities in resolving the factual issue of discriminatory intent.
An illustration would be an employer's continued use of separate seniority
lists for two separate lines of progression which were segregated by race
but are now desegregated, in a situation where all the jobs are functionally
related and the normal pattern would call for a single line of progression
with "line of progression" seniority. Absent such a distortion of customary
arrangements, however, all traditional and legitimately grounded seniority
systems now appear immune to challenge under Title VII. To that extent
the long-term, organized, predominantly white worker has won out over the
black newcomer to the work place.
FAIR REPRESENTATION

In the midst of World War II the Supreme Court for the first time declared that labor organizations have an obligation to represent all the employees in a bargaining unit fairly and without discrimination. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R .R. 18 arose under the Railway Labor Act (RLA) and involved racial discrimination by a union and a cooperative employer. Neither
the RLA nor the National Labor Relations Act expressly imposes any duty
of fair representation. But each act does make a majority union in any
bargaining unit the exclusive representative of all the employees, dissenters
and adherents alike. In Steele the Court concluded that Congress had not
intended to confer (and under the Constitution probably could not have conferred) this extraordinary power without imposing the concomitant obligation to protect minority as well as majority interests. The duty of fair
representation was later extended to the National Labor Relations Act 19 and
to arbitrary treatment on grounds other than race. 20 As soon as judicial review
of union judgments went beyond such plainly invidious classifications as
race, different problems of legal definition and of factual assessment could
have been anticipated. The Burger Court had to confront one of the more
troublesome.
A trucking company discharged several drivers for dishonesty, charging
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that they had sought reimbursement of motel expenses greater than those
actually incurred. Motel receipts submitted by the drivers were in excess
of the charges listed on motel records, whose accuracy was verified by
affidavits from the motel clerk and the motel owner. The drivers suggested
the motel be investigated, but the union told them "there was nothing
to worry about." At an arbitration hearing before a joint union-management
area committee, the employees denied any dishonesty but presented no
other evidence to contradict the company's documents. The committee upheld the discharge. Subsequently the employees sued the employer for unjust discharge in violation of the collective agreement and sued the union
for unfair representation. In a deposition the motel clerk at last admitted
he had falsified the motel records and kept the difference between the
amounts shown there and on the drivers' receipts. The Supreme Court held,
in Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, lnc., 21 that the employer could not rely
on the finality of the arbitral award as a defense against the employees'
suit "if the contractual processes have been seriously flawed by the union's
breach of its duty to represent employees honestly and in good faith and
without invidious discrimination or arbitrary conduct."
The standard of representation enunciated in Hines can hardly be faulted
in the abstract. Yet with the Supreme Court moving beyond the more
clear-cut instances of discrimination and bad faith to reach "arbitrariness"
and "perfunctoriness,"22 the lower courts may be tempted to go on to negligence, or at least gross negligence. This would undoubtedly mean greater
justice for individual employees in given cases, as in Hines. But union
business agents, not learned in the niceties of due process, must often
act quickly under pressure, and their customary aim has been the maximization of group interests, not the furthest pursuit of every individual claim.
Moreover, decisions like Hines mean an employer cannot work out a grievance settlement with its employees' statutory bargaining representative which
will have the same finality as an adjustment reached with a party's lawyer
or other personally chosen agent. An undue extension of Hines could thus
impair a union's flexibility and effectiveness in grievance handling and
undercut its status as the employees' officially designated spokesman in
dealing with their employer. One might reasonably question whether an increasing judicial scrutiny of union decisions involving matters of judgment
and discretion bodes well for the total collective bargaining process.
INTERNAL UNION AFFAIRS

In the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act
of 195923 the federal government undertook for the first time a comprehensive regulation of internal union affairs. By 1969 and the advent of the
Burger era, the federal courts of appeals, with an occasional emendation by
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the Supreme Court, had disposed of many of the most pressing issues
raised by the new statute. Still, a number of significant questions remained
unanswered. In addition, a few important decisions of the Burger Court
interpreting the older National Labor Relations Act dealt more with unionmember relationships than with traditional union-employer relationships. In
several of these sensitive intraunion areas the Court struck a sound and
practical, if not always totally satisfying, balance between individual claims
and institutional interests.
Free Speech and Union Politics
Union members are guaranteed a broad right of free speech under the
Landrum-Griffin Act. They may not be disciplined by their union, for
example, even for libeling the organization's officers. 24 Despite this farreaching protection, the Supreme Court held that a newly elected union
president could lawfully discharge union-appointed business agents who had
supported the opposing candidate for the presidency. 25 The Court emphasized
that the safeguards of the statute apply to rank-and-file members of a labor
organization and not to union officers or employees as such. Removal as
a business agent does not affect one's membership status.
This result is supported by the need for a union president, like any other
elected politician, to be free to choose those members of his staff who
will exercise significant responsibility in the day-to-day operations of the
organization. The Court expressly left open the question of whether it would
be different if the employees occupied nonpolicymaking and nonconfidential
positions. Even so, some nagging concerns are left that the analogy to
civil government may not be entirely congruent. In the one-party system
that prevails in nearly all labor unions, effective political action often requires the inside access that only an ongoing role in the administration can
provide. While the Supreme Court's analysis makes good sense under the
language of the statute, the Court might have been more troubled if it
had dealt with a successful incumbent who had ousted his own dissenting
business agents.
A much more difficult free-speech issue arose in Steelworkers v. Sadlowski.26 In the hotly contested 1977 Steelworkers' election, Edward Sadlowski
relied heavily on financial contributions from outside the union to offset the
support his opponent, Lloyd McBride, received from the incumbent leadership and staff. McBride won handily and thereafter the Steelworkers' Convention forbade any candidate for union office to accept "financial support,
or any other direct or indirect support of any kind" from a nonmember.
In an opinion written by Justice Marshall, a 5 to 4 Supreme Court majority
found this outsider rule to be a "reasonable" qualification on free speech
within the meaning of the proviso to section 10l(a)(2) of Landrum-Griffin.
Declared the Court: "Although it may limit somewhat the ability of insur-

164

Theodore J. St. Antoine

gent union members to wage an effective campaign, an interest deserving
some protection under the statute, it is rationally related to the union's
legitimate interest in reducing outsider interference with union affairs. " 27
Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Brennan and
Blackmun in dissent, insisted that an absolute ban on nonmember contributions was unnecessary to prevent outsider control and would thwart the
efforts of challengers in union elections. One may speculate that Justice
Marshall veered away in this instance from his usual allies in cases involving individual rights because of his acquaintance with the special needs
of mass movements to maintain their autonomy and avoid alien subversion.
Curiously, neither majority nor dissent seemed aware that the proviso of
section 101(a)(2) does not authorize all "reasonable" limitations on free
speech but only such as relate "to the responsibility of every member toward
the organization as an institution and to his refraining from conduct that
would interfere with its performance of its legal or contractual obligations."
The standard examples have been the advocacy of dual unionism, "schism,"
or wildcat strikes; otherwise, the proviso has been tightly confined by the
lower courts. An unfortunate by-product of Justice Marshall's sweeping
generalization that the protections of free speech in section 101(a)(2) are
not equivalent to those in the First Amendment, and his apparent acceptance
of a "rational basis" test for justifying the outsider rule in Sadlowski, could
be a reexamination of the scope of union members' freedom of expression
under Landrum-Griffin. Union administrations may be entitled to considerable deference in the handling of most internal matters, but experience
demonstrates that little latitude should be allowed in the restriction of dissidents' speech.
Union Elections

The Supreme Court has endorsed the secretary of labor's pragmatic approach toward determining what are "reasonable qualifications" for elective
union office under Title IV of the Landrum-Griffin Act. If too many members (perhaps more than two-thirds) are disqualified by a particular rule or
combination of rules, the provisions are presumed invalid. The Supreme
Court agreed in Steelworkers Local 3489 v. Usery 28 that a requirement of
attendance at one-half of a local's meetings during the three years preceding
an election was unreasonable, where the result was that 96.5 percent of the
local's 660 members were ineligible. The rule in the abstract may have had
the legitimate purpose of ensuring knowledgeable and dedicated union
leaders, but in actual operation it had the antidemocratic effect of restricting
eligibility too drastically. In order to afford unions an initial opportunity
to police their own house, however, the Court ruled that the secretary of
labor may not sue to challenge an election on a ground that the complaining member did not raise previously in an internal protest to the union
itself. 29
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Exclusive Representation and Minority Factions

A labor organization's power of exclusive representation received a major
boost in Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization. 30 Minority employees charged a company with racial discrimination
in job assignments and the union filed a formal grievance on their behalf.
Several employees thought the contract procedures were inadequate and
sought unsuccessfully to have the union picket the store in protest. When
the company president refused to deal directly with the employees, they
began picketing on their own, denouncing the store as racist and urging
a customer boycott. After written warnings failed to deter continued picketing, two ringleaders were discharged. In an opinion written by Justice
Marshall, from which only Justice Douglas dissented, the Supreme Court
held that the dismissals did not violate the employees' rights of "industrial
self-determination" guaranteed by section 7 of the NLRA. Their attempts
to bypass the established grievance machinery and engage in separate bargaining with their employer were in derogation of the union's exclusive
representational authority under section 9(a) of the act and cost them the
protection of section 7. Justice Marshall left open the question of whether
the discharges might have violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
Black employees' distrust of predominantly white union representatives
reached a peak in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Blacks formed separate
caucuses within a number of major unions and often demanded separate
representation in contract negotiations and grievance arbitrations. Such actions were understandable. But they constituted a grave threat to the whole
structure of American collective bargaining and to its linchpin, the union's
power of exclusive representation. Speaking with the special weight lent
by the voice of Justice Marshall, the Court in Emporium set itself athwart
these fractionating forces. Whether or not Emporium was the turning point,
the assault on exclusive representation receded with the passing of the
1970s.
Union Security and Political Action
In Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 31 the Burger Court finally confronted and resolved a constitutional issue that the Warren Court had avoided
only through strained statutory interpretation sixteen years earlierY Abood,
in line with private sector precedents, sustained the constitutionality of a
Michigan statute authorizing the negotiation of "agency shop" agreements
under which public employees had to pay a service fee to the union, to the
extent the service charges were used to finance collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment. Then, reaching the longmooted question, the Court held it would be unconstitutional to require a
person "to contribute to the support of an ideological cause he may oppose
as a condition of holding a job" under a union security arrangement. Justice
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Powell, joined by the chief justice and Justice Blackmun, asserted that
there was no basis here for distinguishing "collective bargaining activities"
from "political activities" for First Amendment purposes. They contended
that collective bargaining in the public sector is always political in any
meaningful sense of the word, and the state should have to prove that
any union dues or fees required of nonunion employees are needed to
serve paramount governmental interests.
Neither in Abood nor in other related cases has the Supreme Court ever
addressed the point that unions, in both public and private employment,
are apparently being held to stricter constitutional and statutory limitations
than government itself. The union member can prevent the use of his compulsory dues for political purposes he opposes. The citizen cannot similarly
prevent the use of his tax money by government officials. If the answer to
this is that the legitimate governmental functions of civic personnel are
far broader than the legitimate collective bargaining functions of union
personnel, we are merely led to the more important practical question that
so far the Supreme Court has managed to sidestep: How are a union's
"collective bargaining" activities to be distinguished from its "political"
activities? How does one classify the congressional testimony of the Agricultural Workers' president in support of federal bargaining rights for farm
labor? A union gift to the local United Fund in an effort to gain community
sympathy in forthcoming contract negotiations? A union's expenses in attempting to organize a neighboring plant whose substandard wage scale is
a threat to an existing bargaining unit? Although the protection of dissenters' rights in such cases as Abood can be applauded, sophisticated
judgment will have to be exercised in fixing the boundaries of activities
"germane to collective bargaining," or else a union could be unrealistically
restricted in the use of compulsory dues.
UNION-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS

Despite the focus of the Burger Court's labor cases on individual rights
in the work place, it has made almost as many decisions that are significant
to the more traditional law of union-management relations. It is in this
more conventional area that the greater solicitude of the Burger Court for
conservative values, such as an employer's property rights and managerial
prerogatives, becomes most pronounced. In the landmark cases of the Warren
era dealing with direct union-management confrontations, organized labor
had a victory record on the order of three to one. In such head~on unionemployer clashes before the Burger Court, management won 55 percent of
the cases. In addition, the Burger Court expressly overruled two of the
Warren Court's major prounion decisions 33 and significantly cut back or
undermined three others. 34 For all that, however, it would be a gross over-
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simplification to characterize the Burger Court's record as a sharp reversal
of a legal trend favoring unionism. It is natural that some of the closer,
harder cases have arisen as the NLRA has matured; a 55 to 45 division
is hardly a sign of overwhelming partisanship; and in the early 1980s unions
actually prevailed more often than employers.
Union Organizing
The Burger Court has preserved and even extended the rights of employees
to engage in union solicitation and the distribution of union literature on
company premises during nonworking time, although the results have not
always pleased the chief justice and other Nixon appointees. An employer
may not forbid such activity even though the incumbent union has entered
an agreement purporting to waive the employees' solicitation rights. 35 It
makes no difference whether the employees are opposing or supporting the
incumbent union. It also makes no difference whether the union literature
is more political than organizational in nature, such as a pamphlet opposing
a right-to-work law and supporting a higher minimum wage. 36
The Burger Court awarded employers one notable victory, 5 to 4, in
Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB. 31 Unless a company has engaged in unfair labor practices that would preclude a fair election, the majority held, the company is entitled to insist that a union file a petition
for an election with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), and is
not obliged to recognize the union on the basis of cards signed by a majority
of the employees authorizing the union to represent them. The justices did
not vote simplistically by blocs. There was an unusual, but in these circumstances understandable, alliance of some of the most liberal and some of the
most conservative members of the Court. The employees' interest in the
freest and best informed choice coalesced with the employer's interest in
not having to recognize the union until it had an opportunity to dissuade
the employees from their allegiance to the organization. Justice Douglas
wrote the majority opinion and was joined by Justice Brennan along with
three Nixon appointees. On the other hand, Justice Powell joined Justices
Stewart, White, and Marshall in dissent.
Union Collective Action

Constitutional Protections
In Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 38 the Warren
Court likened a large commercial shopping center to a normal municipal
business block and held that union picketing of a nonunion retailer there was
protected under the First Amendment. Ordinarily, of course, constitutional
guarantees apply only against governmental action, not private action. In
Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 39 the Burger Court refused to extend this
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constitutional analysis to union solicitation on the privately owned parking
lots of a retail establishment. Instead, the proper inquiry was whether the
nonemployee solicitors had a statutory right of access under the NLRA on
the theory there were no reasonably available alternative channels of communication. Then, in Hudgens v. NLRB, 40 the Court declared that statutory
analysis rather than constitutional analysis was also the correct approach
to union picketing of a retail store in a privately owned, enclosed shopping
mall. Justice Stewart, for the majority, declared that "the constitutional
guarantee of free expression has no part to play in a case such as this. "4 '
Logan Valley Plaza was expressly overruled.
The Court seems to have gone out of its way to lay Logan Valley to
rest, without its "ever having been accorded a proper burial," as dissenting
Justices Marshall and Brennan put it. Hudgens had to be remanded for a
determination of the picketers' rights under the NLRA, anyway, and the
resolution of the statutory question might have mooted the constitutional
issue. There is merit in the dissenters' complaint that the majority acted
precipitately in deciding such a "far-reaching constitutional question." Prudence would have counseled waiting for more experience to verify or refute
the dissenters' claim that "the owner of the modem shopping center complex, by dedicating his property to public use as a business district, to
some extent displaces the 'State' from control of historical First Amendment forums, and may acquire a virtual monopoly of places suitable for
effective communication."42 In any event, Logan Valley and Hudgens are
as good a pair of guides as we have to the respective attitudes of the
Warren and Burger Courts in balancing free speech and property rights.
The overruling of Logan Valley Plaza left open a question about the
continuing vitality of a significant dictum in Justice Marshall's majority
opinion in that case. After making the obvious point that the patrolling
element in picketing permits it to be regulated as a form of physical conduct, Justice Marshall went on to stress the "purpose" or "objective" of the
picketing as the crucial factor in determining whether its message may
constitutionally be prohibited or restricted. The cases where bans on picketing
have been upheld, he stated, "involved picketing that was found either
to have been directed at an illegal end . . . or to have been directed to
coercing a decision by an employer which, although in itself legal, could
validly be required by the State to be left to the employer's free choice."43
That test would still leave formidable questions for resolution. But it would
have the great virtue of focusing attention, as in other free speech inquiries,
on the content of the communication, and not on the form it takes. It seems
regrettable if the overruling of Logan Valley's balancing of free speech
and property rights, when the location of the communicator was the issue,
should carry over to Justice Marshall's perceptive words on the wholly

Labor Law

169

different issue of the constitutional status of the picketers' message, regardless of their location.
In 1980, however, the Supreme Court so extended the "unlawful objectives" test for the constitutionality of picketing bans as to strip it of almost
all practical meaning. In NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Local 1001
[Safeco] 44 it held that picketers asking customers not to buy a nonunion
product being distributed by a second party was an unlawful boycott of the
distributor where the distributor derived 90 percent of its income from
sales of the picketed product. There was no indication that the picketing
was intimidating in any way. Six justices considered the prohibition justified
constitutionally by Congress's purpose of blocking the "coercing" or "embroiling" of neutrals in another party's labor dispute.
Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall dissented. But strangely they confined themselves to the statutory argument that the NLRA does not forbid
consumer picketing aimed only at a particular nonunion product, as distinguished from the neutral distributor's business as such. The dissenters
had nothing to say about what even concurring Justice Blackmun termed the
"Court's cursory discussion of what for me are difficult First Amendment
issues."45 No justice dealt adequately with the question of how a union
could constitutionally be prevented from asking individual members of the
public not to purchase a designated nonunion product. Where was the "illegal end" within the meaning of Justice Marshall's Logan Valley formulation? Even if picketing addressed to an organized group like a union can
be characterized as a "signal" calling for an "automatic response," rather
than speech seeking a "reasoned response," is that also a proper characterization, as concurring Justice Stevens suggested, when the picketing
is addressed to individual consumers exercising their own personal choice?46
The Court has failed to provide a convincing rationale for distinguishing
constitutionally between a "Do Not Purchase" appeal conveyed through a
Nader-sponsored newspaper advertisement and a similar message conveyed
through picketing, the working person's standard means of communication.
Even the element of face-to-face confrontation (and arguable psychological
coercion) cannot be the key if, as Justice Stevens maintains, distributing
handbills is also to be placed in a different category from picketing because
the former depends "entirely on the persuasive force of the idea."
Work Preservation and Changing Technology

If Local 100 calls a strike against Ace Manufacturing Co. to get better
wages and working conditions, that is traditional, lawful "primary" activity.
But if Local 100 asks the employees of Black Retailer to strike Black to
force it to stop handling Ace's products until Ace settles with the union,
that is a classic "secondary boycott" and forbidden by section 8(b)(4)(B)
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of the NLRA. So too, if Black agrees with Local 100 not to handle Ace's
products until Ace settles, that is a contractual secondary boycott, a socalled hot goods clause, and forbidden by section 8(e) of the act. In each
instance Local 100 is using its leverage against Black, a neutral, secondary
party, to secure an objective elsewhere-at Ace, the primary party to the
dispute. But suppose Ace agrees with Local 100 that it will keep within
the plant all work traditionally done by Local 100 members and not subcontract any to White Subcontractor. This "no-subcontracting" clause prevents employer dealings, just as the Local 100-Black agreement does. But
here White is not the target; the objective is "work preservation" for Ace's
own employees. This is also recognized as lawful primary activity, the
Supreme Court's touchstone being that it is "addressed to the labor relations
of the contracting employer vis-a-vis his own employees.'' 47
The problem gets stickier if a "product boycott" is involved. Suppose
the employer is a building contractor whose carpenters have traditionally
cut and fitted doors for installation at the job site. The contractor has
agreed with the carpenters union that it will not use "prefitted" doors, which
have been prepared by the manufacturer for immediate installation without
further cutting and fitting. Despite this agreement, the contractor goes ahead
and orders prefitted doors. The union strikes to prevent their use. In National Woodwork Manufacturers Ass'n v. NLRB 48 the Warren Court held,
5 to 4, that such a strike was essentially concerned with ''job preservation,"
the carpenters' traditional work of cutting and fitting doors at the construction site, and that it was therefore primary activity and not an unlawful
secondary boycott. Four dissenting justices maintained that the union's conduct fell squarely within the language of section 8(b)(4)(B)-"forcing ...
any person to cease using . . . the products of any other producer"-and
that product boycotts in particular have consistently been regarded as a
proscribed secondary boycott.
The Burger Court had to handle a product boycott with an added wrinkle.
After agreeing to a standard work preservation clause in a union contract
that precluded the use of certain prefabricated climate controls, the contractor went ahead and entered into a construction subcontract that specified the use of prefabricated units. The union refused to install the units.
The Supreme Court held that this refusal violated section 8(b)(4)(B) in
NLRB v. Enterprise Ass'n of Pipefitters Local 638. 49 The majority reasoned
that the product specifications contained in the employer's subcontract withdrew its "right of control" over the work in dispute, and thus the union's
action was not directed at the contractor's labor relations "vis-a~vis his
own employees," the accepted test for primary activity. The majority apparently regarded the general contractor that had imposed the specifications
as the real target of the union pressure. Justices Brennan, Stewart, and
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Marshall dissented on the quite forceful ground that the Enterprise result
could not be squared with National Woodwork. Certainly it is hard to see
how an employer's voluntary surrender of its "right of control" could metamorphose a union's lawful primary pressure into an illegal secondary boycott. Justices as sensitive to property rights as the majority in Enterprise
should have remembered that the farmer who sells a cow to one buyer
usually cannot tum around and sell the same cow to someone else. One
might have suspected that the majority in Enterprise was basically at odds
with National Woodwork itself. Enterprise gave priority to technological
change and the flexibility of business arrangements over the capacity of
unions to protect their members' jobs. That may be entirely supportable as
a matter of economics, but it hardly squares with secondary boycott concepts. In any event the Supreme Court has long professed that such basic
policy choices are the peculiar province of Congress.
Three years after Enterprise, a 5 to 4 majority of the Supreme Court
somewhat surprisingly took a step back toward National Woodwork. In
NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 50 the Court had to deal with
work preservation in a situation where, as frequently happens, the work
the union was trying to "preserve" had undergone a transformation because
of technological innovation-here, containerized shipping. The ILA had
agreed with a shippers association that ILA labor would have the job of
"stuffing" or "stripping" all containers within a fifty-mile radius of a port,
and that a royalty would be paid on any containers passing over the piers
intact. The NLRB concluded that since the ILA's members had never performed off-pier stuffing or stripping, it was engaged in illegal work acquisition rather than permissible preservation of work within its traditional jurisdiction. The chief justice and Justices Stewart, Rehnquist, and Stevens
accepted this view. But the majority disagreed that the determination that
the work of the longshoremen had historically been the loading and unloading of ships was dispositive.
Writing for the Court, Justice Marshall declared the question was how the
parties "sought to preserve that work, to the extent possible, in the face
of a massive technological change."51 The case was remanded to the labor
board for initial consideration of whether "the stuffing and stripping reserved
for the ILA ... is functionally equivalent to their former work," or whether
"containerization has worked such fundamental changes in the industry that
the work formerly done at the pier . . . has been completely eliminated."
Although insisting the board's answer was not preordained, Justice Marshall
added pointedly: "This determination will, of course, be informed by an
awareness of the congressional preference for collective bargaining as the
method for resolving disputes over dislocations caused by the introduction
of technological innovations in the workplace." A bare majority of the Court
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was once again prepared to allow a union to defend the humane value
of job security even at the risk of some loss in industrial efficiency and
economic progress.
Federal Preemption and State Trespass Laws
During the Burger era the Supreme Court has alternately advanced and
retreated from the preemption line drawn by the Warren Court to exclude
state substantive law from areas regulated by Congress. The chief justice
and other Nixon appointees have generally tended to favor retrenchment,
opening the field to more extensive state regulation. The classic formulation of the Warren Court in the landmark Garmon case52 was that conduct
"arguably protected" or "arguably prohibited" under the NLRA was subject
to the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB. States could act only if vital
local interests, such as the maintenance of public order, were at stake.
What some commentators viewed as a major departure from Garmon's
preemption teachings came in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County
District Council of Carpenters. 53 A store sued a union for trespass in state
court for picketing on its property. No objection was made to the picketing
as such, but only to its location. Under federal law, such peaceful picketing on private property was both arguably protected and arguably prohibited.
The Supreme Court held the arguably prohibited nature of the conduct here
did not support preemption because the state was not regulating the picketing qua picketing but only as trespassory action affecting vital local interests. The Court also held that in the peculiar circumstances of this case,
even the arguably protected element did not justify preemption. The employer
could not get a ruling from the NLRB on actual protection (it could not
file charges against itself); only the union could, and it had declined to
file charges despite the employer's demand that the picketers leave. This
left the employer defenseless unless it resorted to force or could invoke
the state's trespass law. After pointing out that under the NLRA an employer may bar nonemployee union organizers from his property as a "general
rule," the majority concluded that the "risk of an erroneous state court
adjudication . . . is outweighed by the anomalous consequence of a rule
which would deny the employer access to any forum in which to litigate
either the trespass issue or the protection issue in those cases in which
the disputed conduct is least likely to be protected by § 7. " 54
Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall dissented, emphasizing that the
Garmon test "has provided stability and predictability to a particularly complex area of law for nearly 20 years. "55 That practical point is the dissenter's
strong suit. The majori~y has all the theoretical trumps, especially if concurring Justice Blackmun's view that a union's filing of unfair labor practice
charges with the NLRB displaces state court jurisdiction is eventually ac-
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cepted. Then, only a union bereft of hope of prevailing before the board
would be consigned to the sometimes dubious mercies of state court judges.
Collective Bargaining

Duty to Bargain

Employers are required by the NLRA to bargain with the representative
of their employees concerning "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment."56 Over the last two decades, the most controversial
issue concerning the duty to bargain has been the extent to which employers
must negotiate about managerial decisions that result in a shrinkage of
employee job opportunities. Examples include subcontracting, automation,
and plant relocations. Under established precedent, the crucial question is
whether a subject is classified as a "condition of employment" or as a management right. 57 In Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. Nl1UJ, 58 the Warren
Court gave limited approval to the labor board's expansion of the range of
so-called mandatory bargaining. It sustained a board order that a manufacturer bargain over subcontracting out its maintenance work within a plant.
The Court emphasized that this did not alter the company's "basic operation" or require any "capital investmer.L" There was simply a replacement
of one group of employees with another to do the same work in the same
place under the same general supervision. Negotiating would not "significantly abridge" the employer's "freedom to manage the business." That narrow approach did not reach the issue of subcontracting in general, and certainly not the issue of more fundamental structural or technological changes.
The Burger Court revisited the problem, with puzzling results, in First
National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB. 59 It was held that a maintenance
firm did not have to bargain when it decided to terminate an unprofitable
contract to provide janitorial services to a nursing home. The Court first
stated broadly that an employer has no duty to bargain about a decision
"to shut down part of its business purely for economic reasons." 60 But it
then pointed out that in this particular case the operation was not being
moved elsewhere and the laid-off employees were not going to be replaced,
the employer's dispute with the nursing home concerned the size of a
management fee over which the union had no control, and the union had
just recently been installed and thus there was no disruption of an ongoing relationship. The Court consequently left unanswered many questions
regarding the more typical instance of a partial closing or the removal of
a plant to a new location.
Imposing a duty to bargain about managerial decisions such as subcontracting, plant removals, and technological innovation would obviously delay transactions, reduce business adaptability, and perhaps interfere with

174

Theodore J. St. Antoine

the confidentiality of negotiations with third parties. In some instances bargaining would be doomed in advance as a futile exercise. Nonetheless,
the closer we move toward recognizing that employees may have something
akin to a property interest in their jobs, the more apparent it may become
that not even the employer's legitimate regard for profit making or the
public's justified concern for a productive economy should totally override
the workers' claim to a voice in the decisions of ongoing enterprises that
will vitally affect their future employment opportunities. A moral value
is arguably at stake in determining whether employees may be treated as
pawns in management decisions. Often negotiations may benefit both parties
by producing a less drastic solution than a shutdown or a relocation. At
the very least, bargaining may serve a therapeutic purpose. As the Supreme
Court put it in Fibreboard, in words that might sound platitudinous but
for the grim historical reality behind them, the labor act "was framed with
an awareness that refusals to confer and negotiate had been one of the
most prolific causes of industrial strife. " 61
One of the persistent complaints about the National Labor Relations Act
is the inadequacy of the remedy against an employer who unlawfully refuses to recognize or bargain with a majority union. Two or three years,
and sometimes much longer, after the event, a recalcitrant employer will
finally be subject to a judicially enforced order to bargain. Many critics
insist that this is hardly more than a pious exhortation that the wrongdoer
go and sin no more. Rarely will there be any financial repercussions. The
employees receive nothing to make them whole for the losses they may have
suffered by being denied the benefits of collective bargaining for several
years. Apparently this situation will continue. In H. K. Porter Co. v.
NLRB 62 an employer engaged in bad-faith bargaining over an eight-year
period. The dispute mainly revolved around the company's unjustified refusal to agree to "check off" union membership dues from the employees'
pay. Perhaps in exasperation, after several rounds of NLRB proceedings and
court remands, the board at last ordered the employer to grant a checkoff
provision. The Supreme Court held this was beyond the board's remedial
powers.
The Court emphasized that a fundamental policy of the NLRA was "not
to allow governmental regulation of the terms and conditions of employment, but rather to ensure that employers and their employees could work
together to establish mutually satisfactory conditions. "63 Although the Court
conceded that the congressional expression of this policy was contained in
the section of the act defining the duty to bargain, it believed that the
policy against imposing substantive contract terms should also extend to
remedying proven violations. Its fingers thus burned, the NLRB has felt
inhibited by the judgment in H. K. Porter from fashioning novel and potentially effective remedies for employer refusals to bargain, such as "make-
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whole" monetary relief for employees deprived of the fruits of collective
bargaining. This has been true even though technically no continuing contract terms need be imposed, as occurred in H. K. Porter, and at most the
putative contract that might have resulted from good-faith negotiations would
simply be used as a measure of the employees' past losses.
Arbitration and Contract Enforcement

The Norris-LaGuardia Act generally prohibits the federal courts from issuing
injunctions against peaceful strikes. When Congress in section 301 of the
Taft-Hartley Act gave the federal courts jurisdiction over suits to enforce
labor contracts, it deliberately rejected proposals to amend Norris-LaGuardia
to take account of this new development. In Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson,64 the Warren Court made the obvious, logical deduction. Even strikes
in breach of contract remained covered by Norris-LaGuardia's ban on federal
injunctions. But there were evident policy deficiencies in this position. Most
important, employers were deprived of what was often the most efficacious
and sensible weapon against forbidden strikes. In the first year of the Burger
era, the Supreme Court in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770 65
managed to confound the logic of Sinclair (and probably the intent of
Congress) and do justice at last. A crafty opinion by Justice Brennan declared that Congress's refusal to amend Norris-LaGuardia when enacting
Taft-Hartley did not mean the injunction ban was left intact. It merely
meant Congress was prepared to leave to the federal judiciary the task of
working out an appropriate "accommodation" between the two statutes.
Justice Brennan's solution was to authorize federal injunctions against strikes
where the underlying grievance is subject to a "mandatory grievance adjustment or arbitration procedure" in a collective bargaining agreement. While
it may offend purists in statutory construction, this rule has much to commend it in elementary fairness. Norris-LaGuardia was designed to protect
struggling unions against a biased and injunction-wielding judiciary, especially in organizing settings. When an established union has committed
itself contractually not to strike and has been provided an effective alternative means of redress through arbitration, it is hardly a desecration of
Norris-LaGuardia philosophy to grant the employer an injunction if the
union goes back on its word and strikes.
The Burger Court has applied the Boys Markets test for injunctive relief with surprising literalness in favor of labor organizations. Thus, in
Buffalo Forge Co. v. Steelworkers, 66 the Court held no injunction was available against a sympathy strike that was arguably a violation of the union's
no-strike pledge. The key was that the strike was in support of other unions
negotiating with the employer. The strike was not triggered by a dispute
between the employer and the striking union, and hence the union had
no grievance it could resolve through arbitration under its own contract.
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Remedies other than an immediate injunction were of course available to
the employer, including here resort to arbitration. The Supreme Court's
continuing endorsement of arbitration as a centerpiece of national labor
policy was further underscored in Nolde Bros. v. Bakery Workers Local
358. 67 In an opinion by Chief Justice Burger, the Court held arbitrable "a
dispute which arises under the contract," even though "based on events that
occur after its termination. "68 The dispute arose over severance pay called
for in a contract that had expired four days before the company decided
to close its plant permanently.
In two decisions involving "successor" employers, the Burger Court
blurred, if it did not eradicate, major Warren Court teachings on the nature
of the collective bargaining agreement. The earlier view was that it was
"not an ordinary contract," but a "generalized code" setting forth "the common law of a particular industry or of a particular plant."69 A predecessor's
labor contract, in the Warren period, could bind a successor employer where
there was "substantial continuity of identity in the business enterprise,"
without regard to the existence of actual consent. In the Burns International
Security70 and Howard Johnson 7 ' cases, the Burger Court refocused attention
on traditional common law notions of the need for "consent" under "normal
contract principles," and on the question of whether certain rights and duties
were "in fact" "assigned" or "assumed."
On their facts, Burns and Howard Johnson held a predecessor's labor
contract not binding on a rival company that supplanted the predecessor
through competitive bidding or on a purchaser who retained only a minority
of the seller's employees. This left open the possibility that the Warren
successorship doctrine might still apply where there was a genuine link
between predecessor and successor and a majority of the former's employees
remained with the latter. What was more likely reflected here, however,
was a clash of fundamental values in the labor area. The Warren majority
was concerned about protecting employees against a sudden and unforeseen
loss of bargaining and contract rights. There was also a concern about
maintaining industrial stability and labor peace, through reducing the number
of representation elections and· sustaining the life of .labor agreements. On
the other hand, the Burger majority laid stress on the freedom and voluntariness of the collective bargaining process, on the importance of saddling
neither unions nor employers with substantive contract terms to which they
have not agreed. Stress was further laid on providing maximum flexibility
in business arrangements, so that employers may respond to changing market conditions without being straitjacketed by the bargaining or contractual
obligations that may have been assumed by imprudent predecessors. The
future development of successorship law undoubtedly depends far more on
the way the members of the Supreme Court ultimately balance out these
competing values than on any logical deductions from the decisions to date.
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Antitrust

The leading candidate as the Burger Court's most mangled labor decision
would have to be Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers Loca/100. 72 The
fault was not entirely the Burger Court's. Connell was only the latest in a
long line of cases in which the Supreme Court has essayed the well-nigh
futile task of reconciling age-old union restrictive practices with the strictures
of the antitrust laws. The two worlds are fundamentally at odds. The essence of antitrust philosophy is the promotion of competition; the essence
of unionism is the elimination of competition, at least the elimination of
wage competition among all employees doing the same job in the same
industry. An uneasy truce has prevailed whenever the Supreme Court has
recognized that the antitrust laws have little if any place in dealing with
restraints in the labor market, that is, the area of wages, hours, and working
conditions, and that antitrust doctrines should largely be confined to restraints in the product market, the commercial sale of goods and services.
Improper union restraints are more appropriately regulated through labor
legislation, tailored to fit the peculiar characteristics and behavior of labor
organizations.
In Connell a plumbers local picketed a general contractor and secured
an agreement that the contractor would subcontract mechanical work only
to firms that had a collective bargaining contract with the union. The contractor then sued the local for violating the Sherman Antitrust Act. In a
5 to 4 decision the Supreme Court sustained the cause of action. In the
majority's view, the local had used direct restraints on the commercial
market to achieve its concededly lawful organizational objective. As stated
by Justice Powell, the restrictive agreement was designed to force nonunion
subcontractors out of the market, "even if their competitive advantages were
not derived from substandard wages and working conditions but rather from
more efficient operating methods. " 73 Viewed solely in antitrust terms this
makes some sense, although it ignores long-standing precedent that the antitrust laws exempt agreements, whether primary or secondary, that are immediately aimed at promoting union organization 74 as well as agreements
that are aimed at eliminating competition over wages and other labor standards. The principal vice of Justice Powell's majority opinion, however, is
its total disregard of the necessary implications of applicable labor law.
When Congress outlawed "hot goods" agreements in section 8(e) of the
amended NLRA, it recognized the special interrelationship of a general
contractor and its subcontractors in the construction industry, and added a
proviso excepting agreements regarding "work to be done" at a job site.
The acknowledged purpose was to permit unions and employers in the
building trades to enter "union-only" subcontracting arrangements. Indeed,
the NLRB's general counsel has expressly declined to issue unfair labor
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practice complaints against contracts like the one at issue in Connell.
Justice Powell evaded the force of the 8(e) proviso by engrafting two or
three qualifications, none of which finds substantial support in the legislative history. The authorization for excluding nonunion contractors, he
said, "extends only to [subcontracting] agreements in the context of collective bargaining relationships, and . . . possibly to common-situs relationships on particular jobsites as well. "75 The plumbers' clause barring nonunion subcontracting in Connell failed to meet this test, since the local
did not seek to represent employees working directly for the general contractor but only the employees of plumbing subcontractors. 76
The egregious failure of the Connell majority to take proper account of
the policies of the labor laws in working out an accommodation with the
antitrust laws was the principal focus of Justice Stewart's dissent. The
plumbers' secondary activity at the Connell site was subject to comprehensive regulation under Taft-Hartley, and antitrust sanctions would necessarily
upset the balance thus struck by Congress. True, section 303 of the Taft
Act, providing for actual damages for secondary strikes in violation of
section 8(b)(4), was not amended in 1959 to cover secondary agreements
in violation of section 8(e). But that should not have meant, as Justice
Powell inferred, that the omission of actual damages under Taft-Hartley for
8(e) violations made them liable to treble damages under Sherman. In the
hierarchy of labor law values, coercive conduct is almost invariably subject to more severe sanctions than is an agreement having the same restrictive results. 77 It would therefore have been incongruous for Congress
to prescribe actual damages under section 303 for secondary activity in
violation of section 8(b)(4), but not for agreements in violation of section
8(e), all for the purpose of subjecting the latter alone to the much harsher
remedy of treble damages under the antitrust laws.
Beyond that misreading of feder:al labor law, perhaps the most disquieting aspect of the majority's approach was its pronouncement that to permit
subcontracting agreements with "stranger" contractors, without confinement
to particular job sites, "would give construction unions an almost unlimited
organizational weapon. " 78 If any lesson should have been learned from a
century of federal intervention in labor disputes, it is that the Congress
and not the courts ought to have the primary responsibility for determining
what economic weapons are allowable to either party in a labor dispute.
CONCLUSION

Organized labor is in decline in the United States. While the movement
has grown to over twenty million, the labor force has expanded more
rapidly, and union membership has fallen to only 19.7 percent of the total. 79
That is, proportionately, less than half the union population in Great Britain
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or Western Europe. And American unions today consistently lose over 50
percent of the representation elections in which they participate. 80 The principal cause of membership shrinkage and organizing failures is undoubtedly
the shift of jobs from the blue-collar to the white-collar sectors. But it
cannot be wholly coincidental that the period of organized labor's most
dramatic growth began with the Wagner Act and practically ended with
Taft-Hartley and that over the past quarter of a century unions have suffered an unbroken string of defeats in congressional battles concerning the
balance of power between labor and management. At least psychologically,
and presumably in much more tangible ways as well, the state of the law
affects a union's capacity to organize and bargain.
Although the Burger Court's overall record has proved more moderate
than the labor movement may have anticipated, the Court's secondary boycott and antitrust rulings in the construction industry, its ruling on shopping
center picketing in retail settings, and its "successorship" rulings in industry
generally, to mention a few noteworthy examples, tip the scales still further
against union organizational efforts. Beside the stark statistics on union
infirmity, the Connell majority's fear that unless section 8(e) of the NLRA
is read to mean what it does not say, building trades unions would be
given an "almost unlimited organizational weapon" seems an oddly misplaced concern. Federal labor law as written, without any stretching by
the judiciary, appears more than adequate to suppress nearly any exercise
of overweening union power.
The Burger Court's parsing of the statutory rights of individual workers
has been more consistently defensible, even when controversial. Institutionalists may argue that the Court went too far in applying the duty of
fair representation in Hines, the case of the altered motel receipts, and
civil libertarians may contend that it sacrificed minority interests to outmoded notions of job seniority in cases like Teamsters and Patterson. But
in weighing those and similar claims under the NLRA, Title VII, and
Landrum-Griffin, the Court has constantly had to balance one person's
grievance against the equities of fellow workers and the institutional needs
of the collective representative of the entire group. All in all, the Court
has responded sensibly in its handling of individual and minority rights.
They have generally been accorded the high priority they deserve. At the
same time, however, the Court has not forgotten that the mass of employees, too, have rights and that healthy, effective labor organizations
are the best means yet devised for securing those rights in the work place.

